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Abstract:
As robots get damaged or security compromised, their components will increasingly
require updates and replacements. Contrary to the expectations, most manufacturers
employ planned obsolescence practices and discourage repairs to evade competition.
We introduce and advocate for robot teardown as an approach to study robot hard-
ware architectures and fuel security research. We show how our approach helps
uncovering security vulnerabilities, and provide evidence of planned obsolescence
practices.
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1 Introduction
Robotics is the art of system integration [MHK+17]. A robot is a network of networks, with
sensors, actuators, and dedicated computing resources, according to its application. A robotic
manipulator, for instance, include the arm’s mechanics (which generally include actuators and
sensors), the human-machine interface (HMI), the controller (the main compute substrate for
reasoning), and any additional safety mechanism. Most industrial robots of this kind range from
tenths to hundreds of thousands of Euros. Accordingly, it is only reasonable to consider the need
for repairing robots.
Unfortunately, most robot manufacturers follow planned obsolescence practices nowadays and
organize approved distributors and integrators into private networks, providing repair parts only
to certified companies. Among the most recent examples we observe the case of Teradyne,
which robots are advertised as collaborative (i.e., designed to safely work in close contact with
humans), while research unveils that they lack of safety measures [MJC+19] and a concerning
cybersecurity [AZG+18] landscape.
Given these premises, we promote robot teardown as a systematic process to repair robots,
improve robot hardware and research its security. In the long run, we argue that the more re-
searchers and practitioners will get used to systematically teardown robots, the more this practice
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will impact the quality assurance of hardware in robotics, putting pressure on manufacturers to
produce robots with better hardware security measures, thereby safer.
2 Robot teardown
A robot teardown is the process of analyzing a robot’s hardware architecture to model its func-
tional behavior and physical components, through systematic disassembling. We identify three
key purposes in robotics: a) dissection and analysis to evaluate the status of a product, b) compet-
itive benchmarking against similar products, and c) gain engineering experience and knowledge.
We focus on a) and c) through three case studies on the robots from Universal Robots (UR)
and Mobile Industrial Robots (MiR), which have tenths of thousands of units sold and operating
in close contact with humans (as collaborative robots), and have been already shown lacking
security measures [MJD+19] from these two manufacturers.
Due to space limitations, we leave the complete walk-through of these case studies to an
extended version of this paper, focusing now only on the outcome.
Figure 1: Teardown of three industrial collaborative robots: UR3 CB series (first three), UR3e
e-Series (fourth to sixth) and MiR100 (last three).
2.1 Case Study 1: Teardown of an industrial collaborative robot
The safety logic of the UR3 CB-Series collaborative robot runs on a NXP LPC4437JET256
microcontroller, which datasheet1 highlights that the microcontroller is not suitable for safety-
critical systems according to the silicon vendor. This leads us to question the quality and reliabil-
ity of the safety implementation within these robots. Therefore, through teardown, we were able
1 https://www.nxp.com/docs/en/data-sheet/LPC435X 3X 2X 1X.pdf
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to identify and pinpoint hardware components that don’t meet the quality standards for the safety
situations the robot may have to face, leading to an overall improved scenario for end-users.
2.2 Case Study 2: Teardown of a next-gen industrial collaborative robot
Following the CB-Series, we proceeded and disassembled one of the latest releases from Uni-
versal Robots, the UR3e, an e-Series. While the external look remains similar, the internals have
changed significantly: 1) The e-Series controller integrates a single power supply unit (PSU),
while the CB-series had two, 2) while the CB-Series presented two boards containing compute,
power, and safety logic, the e-Series presents only one single printed circuit board (PCB) featur-
ing a Xilinx Artix-7 series field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), widely used for implement-
ing safety logic in a variety of automotive and control domains, 3) the base filter PCB—which
helps interface power and RS485 communications from the controller (e-Series) to the robot
arm mechanics—is similar to the one present in the CB-series, 4) the arm’s mechanics connec-
tor changed in the e-Series but the power and communications lines remain coherent (through
the base filter board) and 5) the electronics within the arm’s mechanics do not present relevant
changes from an interoperability perspective, which should facilitate re-purposing and reuse.
2.3 Case Study 3: Teardown of a mobile industrial robot
The MiR-100 is a popular mobile robot manufactured by the Danish Mobile Industrial Robots
(MiR), also owned by the US Teradyne. The first impression is that various components of the
robot could be improved from a safety perspective. Also, the teardown helped understand how
this robot presents multiple (internal and external) networks and how each one of the sensors and
actuators are connected across these networks, forming the data layer graph. The robot itself is
powered by Robot Operating System (ROS) [QGC+09] and gaining further understanding of the
ROS computational graph requires understanding also its underlying hardware mapping (from
which one derives the data layer graph). The teardown exercise supplies exactly this and allows
to produce a data layer graph represented in the form of a hardware schematic which can then be
used in combination with the computational graph to gain further understanding of the robot.
3 Teardown to research security and identify planned obsolescence
Teardown supports Kerckhoffs’ principle in revealing all the details and weaknesses of a security
system, excluding volatile secrets such as keys or credentials stored in memory. Overall, the his-
tory of proprietary systems violating Kerckhoffs’ principle by pursuing security-by-obscurity is
rich of failure cases (with the military domain as the sole exception). As part of this research, our
group identified more than 100 security flaws across the three robots described above over a pe-
riod of two years. Most of the flaws were cataloged as vulnerabilities and 17 obtained new CVE
IDs, all of which was publicly disclosed at the Robot Vulnerability Database (RVD) [MJD+19].
In most cases, these robots present few or no security measures, allowing adversaries to easily
exploit the flaws of internal components (e.g. as demonstrated in RVD#2558, RVD#2561 or
RVD#2562), so compromising the robot behavior or taking full control of it.
We argue that robot teardown is key for security research, as proper knowledge of the hardware
helps determine potential attack vectors and which additional elements can help mitigate security
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issues when the manufacturer does not react. As an example, our group introduced an additional
commercial off-the-shelf hardware firewall within MiR’s internal network between the main
controller and the SICK’s safety PLC mitigating RVD#2558, without having to modify any parts
of the firmware.
Throughout this work, we found planned obsolescence particularly evident in the robots from
Universal Robots. From an electrical point of view, these two robots present a similar layout
for interfacing with the robot arm. The manufacturer however introduced subtle changes meant
to make this particular intent harder. Our work showed how through teardown, we learned how
to bypass these limitations using commercial off-the-shelf components with a total BOM price
under 30 Euros.
4 Conclusions
We are concerned about the growing trend in robotics to create private networks of certified
groups, a common practice shown by manufacturers like MiR or UR, both owned by Teradyne.
We presented robot teardowns as an approach to study robot hardware architectures, obtain re-
pairing capabilities, uncover planned obsolescence, and research its security. We advocate for
a ‘Right to Repair’ in robotics and encourage end-users to reflect their needs into their supply
chains and into the original upstream robot manufacturers.
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